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“A remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
Not getting access to appropriate medication violates 
the Eighth Amendment. Opioid use disorder (OUD) is covered 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which 
requires access to services, such as medication, that is in 
connection with drug rehabilitation. Therefore, even if there are 
loopholes under the Eighth Amendment, the ADA tightly 
restricts those by requiring correctional facilities to provide 
medication-assisted treatment (MAT) to qualified individuals. 
A willfully ignorant administrative authority should not have 
the power to decide on someone’s health care, especially when 
such a decision is influenced by deeply ingrained stigma. The 
American Bar Association (ABA) Standards, as well as case law, 
continue to find that only a qualified medical professional 
should be allowed to make these types of health decisions. 
Although courts have begun to enforce compliance with the 
Eighth Amendment, ADA, and ABA Standards, correctional 
facilities continue to prohibit access to MAT through various 
loopholes; therefore, this article proposes that courts find a 
constitutional right to MAT to ensure compliance among 
correctional facilities.      
The proposal offered here works for three reasons. First, 
as a constitutional matter; the Eighth Amendment requires that 
incarcerated individuals receive medical attention when there 
is a serious medical need. By mandating that correctional 
facilities provide MAT, correctional facilities would then be 
complying with the constitution. Second, from a human rights 
perspective; by providing MAT to incarcerated individuals, 
correctional facilities are providing adequate protections to 
marginalized individuals who experience various types of 
discrimination based on their disability. Third, it is more likely 
to change the stigma that is deeply embedded in our society. If 
correctional facilities have to provide MAT to incarcerated 
individuals, their preconceived notions could be eradicated 
 
2 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). 
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because they will observe first-hand that MAT decreases 
recidivism and poses no security issue. This, in addition to the 
decrease in substance abuse and recidivism, could shift 
society’s views of people with substance abuse disorders and 
result in more equal rights. 
Part I will provide background as to why opioid use 
disorder should be addressed in correctional facilities. Part II 
will explore the constitutional right to receive appropriate 
treatment despite being incarcerated, as well as explore 
statutory guidelines within the ADA and suggestions made by 
the ABA. Part III will compare state policies to demonstrate 
how states have begun to make systemic changes and will 
discuss which approaches have been successful. This comment 
concludes by offering solutions on how to ensure constitutional 
compliance among correctional facilities in a way that serves 
the incarcerated individual’s best medical interest. 
PART I: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES 
While the incarceration rate in the United States is 
starting to decline, there are almost 2.3 million people confined, 
making the United States one of the countries with the highest 
incarceration rate.3 Nearly 65% of individuals in correctional 
facilities have a substance use disorder.4 This does not account 
for the people in the general population who have an opioid use 
disorder. In 2017, 2.1 million people in the United States had an 
opioid use disorder.5 Over 70,000 drug deaths occurred in 2017, 
which is a 9.6% increase from 2016.6 Opioids were involved in 
 
3 Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 
2019, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html.           . 
4 Medication-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder in the Justice 
System, AM. ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF OPIOID DEPENDENCE, INC. 
(Oct. 2017), http://www.aatod.org/advocacy/fact-sheets/.      . 
5 2017 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED 
TABLES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION: CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND 
QUALITY (Sept. 7, 2018).  
6 Opioid Overdose: Drug Overdose Deaths, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION                      
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
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47,600 overdose deaths in 2017, making opioids the main driver 
of drug deaths.7 
Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) is a mental illness defined 
as a “problematic pattern of opioid use leading to clinically 
significant impairment or distress.”8 OUD is the “maladaptive 
use of opioids, prescribed or illicit, resulting in two or more 
criteria that reflect impaired health or function over a twelve-
month period.”9 Withdrawal symptoms, which can include 
increased pulse, vomiting, diarrhea, excessive sweating, bone 
and joint aches, anxiety, and irritability,10 may begin within four 
to six hours of the last opioid use and may last for up to several 
months.11 Long-term withdrawal symptoms can occur for much 
longer and include anxiety, depression, sleep disturbances, 
fatigue, dysphoria, and irritability.12 There is a high likelihood 
of relapse after withdrawal. 
The criminal justice system is the “largest source of 
organizational referrals to addiction treatment;” therefore, 
there is a valuable opportunity to facilitate the path to 
recovery.13 While 63% of inmates meet the criteria for OUD,14 
only a limited percentage of incarcerated individuals with 
opioid addiction receive the treatment deemed necessary by 
medical professionals: medication-assisted treatment (MAT).15 
MAT is a medication treatment that satisfies the chemical 
dependence to help the individual refrain from illicit opioid-use 
 
7 Id.       
8 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 5th ed. 541 (2013). 
9 Hilary S. Connery, Medication-Assisted Treatment of Opioid Use 
Disorder: Review of the Evidence and Future Directions, 23 HARV. REV. 
OF PSYCHIATRY 63, 63 (2015). 
10 Id.       
11 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE 
JAIL-BASED MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT: PROMISING PRACTICES, 
GUIDELINES, AND RESOURCES FOR THE FIELD 21 (2018).            
12 Ctr. for Substance Abuse Treatment, Protracted Withdrawal, vol. 9 
Issue 1 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT ADVISORY (2010).                
13NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
supra note 11.  
14 Id.       
15 This Comment refers to MAT concerning treatment for OUD only, 
even though it is used as a treatment for other addictions, such as 
alcohol and tobacco. 
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while the individual stabilizes the physical and social 
dependence to opioid use. MAT includes medications such as 
methadone, buprenorphine—neither of which can be abruptly 
discontinued16—and naloxone, which are prescribed as part of 
a comprehensive treatment plan that includes counseling and 
support groups. Once the physical and social dependencies are 
stabilized, physicians recommend that the individual ween off 
the medication. 
Methadone has been used for addiction treatment since 
1964 and was approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
in 1972.17 It works by activating opioid receptors in the body to 
suppress cravings. Typically, only detainees who are already on 
methadone at the start of detention may receive a week’s worth 
of treatment. Pregnant women, however, are allowed to remain 
on treatment until they give birth as MAT helps reduce the 
withdrawal effects on a fetus.18 The FDA approved 
Buprenorphine in 2002 as a treatment method for OUD.19  
Buprenorphine is an “opioid partial agonist” meaning that it 
produces effects such as euphoria in low doses.20 These effects 
are weaker than other drugs, such as methadone. 
Buprenorphine’s effects increase with each dose until it levels 
off, which is known as the “ceiling effect.”21 The ceiling effect 
lowers the risk of misuse, dependency, and side effects.22 
Naloxone is another drug that was approved by the FDA and 
works to prevent overdose by blocking opioid receptor sites, 
 
16 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
supra note 11, at 9.  
17 Methadone, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-
treatment/treatment/methadone (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
18 German Lopez, How America’s prisons are fueling the opioid epidemic, 
VOX. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2018/3/13/17020002/prison-opioid-epidemic-medications-
addiction.      
19 Buprenorphine, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-
treatment/treatment/buprenorphine (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
20 Id.       
21 Id.      
22 Id.      
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which reverses the toxic effects of the overdose.23 When 
switching from one form of MAT to another, there are specific 
guidelines to how much time should lapse to ensure safe 
conditions for the recipient.24 Despite being a federally 
approved treatment option, fewer than 40 of the 3,200 
correctional facilities offer methadone.25 Only five states have 
correctional facilities that offer both methadone and 
buprenorphine, while only Rhode Island offers all three MAT 
options.26      
Individuals referred to MAT treatment through the 
criminal justice system were less likely to receive treatment 
compared to individuals who were referred to treatment 
outside of the criminal justice system based on the same 
qualifications.27 Only 4.6% of justice-referred people received 
treatment while incarcerated when compared to the 40.9% of 
individuals referred to MAT treatment through other methods, 
such as probation or parole.28 Only 16% of correctional facilities 
offer addiction treatment in settings segregated from the 
general prison population.29  Approximately 10% of inmates 
receive addiction treatment services, while an even smaller 
subset receives evidence-based care.30 Correctional facilities do 
not want to provide MAT for two primary beliefs: (1) the 
provided medications are narcotics, which is something that the 
criminal justice system wants to keep out of facilities, and (2) 
 
23 Naloxone, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-
treatment/treatment/naloxone (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
24 NAT’L SHERIFFS’ ASS’N & NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
supra note 11, at 10-11. 
25 Christin Vestal, New Momentum for Addiction Treatment Behind Bars, 
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/04/04/new-momentum-for-
addiction-treatment-behind-bars.      
26 Id.       
27 Noa Krawczyk et.al., Only One in Twenty Justice-Referred Adults in 
Specialty Treatment for Opioid Use Receive Methadone or Buprenorphine, 
36 Health Aff. 2046, (2017). 
28 Id.       
29 THE NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE USE AT COLUM. 
UNIV., BEHIND BARS II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON 
POPULATION, 4  (2010).  
30 Id.       
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methadone merely substitutes one addiction for another and is 
not viewed as a true tool of recovery. However, inmates are at 
a higher risk of overdose within the first two weeks of release 
from correctional facilities that do not provide MAT.31 
The beliefs of the correctional facilities concerning MAT 
access are based on stigma. The Constitution, Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Standards all outline the importance of providing 
adequate medication to inmates, while directly rebuking the 
misplaced beliefs of the correctional facilities.      
PART II: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
I. The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”32 
The Supreme Court began to review prisoner’s medical care 
under the Eighth Amendment in the landmark case Estelle v. 
Gamble, holding that prisons are required to provide adequate 
medical treatment to incarcerated individuals because 
incarceration removes an individual’s ability to access 
alternative care.33 The Court applied the same ruling to state 
prisons through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Estelle, the plaintiff was injured when a 600-pound bale 
of cotton fell on him while unloading a truck during a prison 
work assignment.34 After enduring months of pain, prison 
guards refused to follow the doctor’s directions, including 
altered sleeping arrangements and providing his prescribed 
pain medication, claiming that the prescription was lost.35 The 
plaintiff was kept in solitary confinement for two months after 
 
31 Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, A Legal Right to Access to 
Medications for the Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder in the Criminal 
Justice System , Bloomberg Am. Health Initiative (Dec. 2018), 
https://americanhealth.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/inline-
files/AkinGump_Memo_Opioids_121218.pdf. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
33 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
34 Id. at 99. 
35 Id. 
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refusing to work due to the heightened pain.36 While in solitary 
confinement, the plaintiff continued to experience severe back 
pain, chest pains, high blood pressure, and “blank outs” but 
was denied access to the prison doctor on at least two 
occasions.37       
The Court was hesitant to use the Eighth Amendment to 
enforce protections for inmates, noting that “the primary 
concern of the drafters was to proscribe tortures and other 
barbarous methods of punishment.”38 However, the Court held 
that correctional institutions cannot be “deliberately indifferent” 
to the “serious medical needs” of individuals within their custody, 
since that would contravene the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
against cruel and unusual punishment.39 An inmate must rely 
on prison authorities to treat his medical needs and, if the 
authorities fail to do so, then the needs will not be met.40 
a. SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court loosely defined “serious 
medical need” as “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” 
caused by the failure to treat.41 A serious medical need is “one 
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment 
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily 
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”42 The idea of 
serious medical need has no formal standard, but it has been 
explored by many courts. The First Circuit in Laaman v. 
Helgemoe identifies a serious medical need as one that “has been 
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is 
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the 
necessity for a doctor’s attention.”43 The Second Circuit in Brock. 
v. Wright established three factors: (1) whether a reasonable 
 
36 Id. at 100 n.5. The plaintiff refers to it as “administrative 
segregation,” but the State never specified what that meant; 
therefore, the Court of Appeals deemed it the equivalent of solitary 
confinement.  
37 Id. at 101. 
38 Id. at 102. 
39 Id. at 104. (emphasis added). 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
42 Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). 
43 Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D. N.H. 1977). 
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doctor or patient would perceive the medical need in question 
as important and worthy of comment or treatment; (2) whether 
the medical condition significantly affects daily activities; and 
(3) the existence of chronic and substantial pain.44 Lower courts 
generally consider three different factors: (1) whether the 
condition can be treated; (2) the consequences of foregoing 
treatment; and (3) the likelihood of a favorable outcome from 
the treatment.45      
b. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
The Supreme Court elaborated on the definition of 
deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, holding that a 
“prison official may be held liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for denying human conditions of confinement 
only if he knows that inmates face a serious risk of harm and 
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 
abate it.”46 Thus, deliberate indifference is when a prison official 
recklessly disregards a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner 
and has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” such that the 
failure to treat the serious medical need is cruel.47 “Whether a 
prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk 
is a question of fact . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a 
prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that 
the risk was obvious.”48 
Many lower courts have followed suit and have defined 
deliberate indifference as conduct that is more than mere 
negligence, including:      
(1) knowledge of a serious medical need and a 
failure or refusal to provide care; (2) delaying 
treatment for non-medical reasons; (3) grossly 
inadequate care; (4) a decision to take an easier 
but less efficacious course of treatment; or (5) 
 
44 Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003). 
45 William J. Rold, Thirty Years After Estelle v. Gamble: A Legal 
Retrospective, 14:1 J. OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH Care 11, 16 (2008).                 
46 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). 
47 Id. at 834, 836 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). 
48 Id. at 842. 
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medical care that is so cursory as to amount to 
no treatment at all.49 
Courts agree that “prisoners are guaranteed the right under 
the Eighth Amendment to be free from deliberate indifference 
by correctional institutions to their serious physical or 
psychological needs.”50 However, courts differ on the level of 
inadequate care needed to constitute deliberate indifference. A 
“simple difference in medical opinion between the medical staff 
and an inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of 
treatment” does not establish deliberate indifference.51  Courts 
avoid second-guessing the professional judgment of a 
particular course of treatment or diagnosis52 and have found 
that ignoring prior diagnoses and treatment is deliberate 
indifference.53 However, courts have consistently held that 
denying an inmate treatment for a painful condition based on 
non-medical reasons, such as funding, falls within the scope of 
deliberate indifference.54 Courts have also held that refusal of 
medical attention based on “ease and less efficacious 
treatment” rather than the exercise of professional judgment is 
deliberate indifference.55 
What is clear is that “failure to provide basic psychiatric and 
mental health care states a claim of deliberate indifference to the 
serious medical needs of prisoners.”56 Courts have interpreted 
Estelle to hold that inmates are entitled to psychological or 
psychiatric treatment if a physician concludes that the prisoner 
has symptoms of a serious disease that could be substantially 
alleviated and that denying care could cause the prisoner 
 
49 Baez v. Rogers, 522 Fed. Appx. 819, 821. (11th Cir. 2013) (citing 
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)).  
50 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). 
51 Id. 
52 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). 
53 Rivera v. Goord, 119 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
54 See Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986); Dunn v. 
Dunn, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1130 (M.D. Ala. 2016); Ancata v. Prison 
Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985). 
55 See Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974); United 
States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970); 
McElligot, 182 F.3d at 1248. 
56 Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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substantial harm.57 Even if there is deliberate indifference, there 
must also be a serious medical need for the situation to be 
violative of the Eighth Amendment. Both parts of the Eighth 
Amendment analysis are inconsistently applied throughout 
courts causing uncertainty in treatment modalities for 
individuals with OUD. Despite this inconsistent application, 
inmates with OUD are still entitled to MAT under the ADA. 
II. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Although limited, case law has begun to provide people 
with OUD protections under the ADA. The ADA defines 
disability as a “physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] 
individual.”58 Physical or mental impairment includes drug 
addiction.59 People with OUD suffer from a physical or mental 
impairment that limits major life activities including caring for 
oneself, learning, concentrating, thinking, and 
communicating.60 OUD also limits the operation of major 
bodily functions, such as neurological and brain functions; 61 
therefore, OUD is a disability within the ADA’s protections.62      
Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with 
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.”63 Correctional facilities 
constitute a public entity64 which is defined as “any state or 
local government; any department [or] agency . . . of a State 
or . . . local government,”65 and are clearly subject to the ADA.66 
The ADA also states “an individual shall not be denied health 
 
57 Bowring, 551 F.d at 47; see also Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 
(5th Cir. 1974); Laaman, 437 F. Supp. at 313; Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 
F. Supp. 886, 891 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Collins v. Schoofield, 344 F. Supp. 
257, 277 (D. Md. 1972). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)          . 
59 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(b)(2). 
60 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
61 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 12102; 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(b)(2). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
64 Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998). 
65 42 U.S.C. § 12131. 
66 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211-12. 
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services, or services provided in connection with drug 
rehabilitation, on the basis of the current illegal use of 
drugs . . . .”67 To assert a claim under the ADA, an individual 
must establish: 
 
(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; 
(2) that he was excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of some public entity’s 
services, programs, or activities or was 
otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that 
such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 
discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s 
disability.68 
Under the ADA, a plaintiff can pursue different types of 
disability discrimination claims, such as stating that: 
 
(a) the imposition of adverse consequences on a 
prisoner based on the prisoner’s disability, (b) a 
prison policy that is neutral in its terms, but 
impacts prisoners with a disability more 
significantly, or (c) the refusal by the prison 
administrators to grant the prisoner a reasonable 
accommodation so that the prisoner can have 
meaningful access to a prison program or 
service.69      
Under the third option, a “prison program or service” includes 
medical services.70 To state a claim, a plaintiff must identify the 
disability and the relationship between the disability and policy 
on which the discrimination claim is based.      
Under the ADA, correctional facilities are clearly 
discriminating against inmates. Because individuals diagnosed 
with OUD are considered qualified individuals under the ADA, 
they must have access to any medically approved treatment 
option while under the supervision of a public entity. By not 
 
67 42 U.S.C. § 12210(c). 
68 Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2019). 
69 Wilbur v. Fitzpatrick, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136898 (D. Me. 2018); 
see also, Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 
2014). 
70 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210. 
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providing MAT to inmates and pretrial detainees who are 
diagnosed with OUD, correctional facilities are intentionally 
denying health services on the assumption of current illegal 
drug use, which violates the ADA. Not providing the 
appropriate medication—MAT—causes excessive physical 
ailments, of which inmates would not experience if it were not 
for the facility’s policy; therefore, the facility imposes adverse 
consequences based on the inmate’s disability. To succeed 
under the third approach, an individual does not need to show 
that other individuals receive more favorable treatment—that 
other individuals have access to MAT—but must only show 
that they are being denied proper access to a prison program 
based on their disability.71 Correctional facilities are failing to 
accommodate individuals with OUD by not providing MAT; 
therefore denying access to the prison’s medical service.      
III. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS  
The American Bar Association House of Delegates used 
constitutional and statutory law, correctional policies and 
professional standards, and professional consulting to establish 
functional parameters to guide the operation of American 
correctional facilities to promote “safety, humaneness, and 
effectiveness of our correctional facilities.”72 The purpose of 
these Standards is “to shape the institutions of government in 
such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution” 
and are intended to establish the conditions expected in 
confinement facilities.73 The Standards acknowledge Estelle’s 
role in setting precedent for the treatment of prisoners, but 
further develop the test by stating “what is needed is not care 
that barely passes the ‘deliberate indifference’ test, but rather a 
standard of care set by reference to the community.”74  The ABA 
establishes the Standards based on the idea that there is a 
universal belief among correctional facilities, which is “if 
 
71 Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 274 (2d Cir. 2003). 
72 A.B.A., TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 1 (3d ed. 2011), available at 
https://caitlinkellyhenry.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ABA-
Health-Care-Treatment_of_Prisoners-2010.pdf. 
73 Id. at 5-6. 
74 Id. at 150. 
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medical science has determined the appropriate treatment for a 
given illness, that treatment is no less appropriate in prison.”75 
First, according to the Standards, correctional authorities 
should ensure that “a qualified health care professional is 
designated the responsible health authority for each facility, to 
oversee and direct the provision of health care in that facility”76 
because “prisoners should be provided timely access to 
appropriately trained and licensed health care staff in a safe and 
sanitary setting designed and equipped for diagnosis or 
treatment.”77 The qualified medical professional should be 
available for inmates suffering from severe pain.78 Having one 
qualified medical care professional is not enough to satisfy the 
Standards. Correctional facilities should have multiple 
qualified medical and mental health professionals at each 
facility to provide appropriate health care in a timely manner.79      
After a facility has satisfied the need for qualified health 
care professionals, a correctional facility “should ensure each 
prisoner’s continuity of care, including with respect to medication, 
upon entry into the correctional system [and] during 
confinement . . . .”80 A prisoner who is found to be “lawfully 
taking prescription drugs . . . when they enter a correctional 
facility . . . should be maintained on that course of medication 
or treatment or its equivalent until a qualified health care 
professional directs otherwise . . . .”81 This includes treatment 
and habilitation services to prisoners with mental illness or 
other cognitive impairments.82 If there are any difficulties with 
providing treatment to those with mental illnesses or other 
cognitive impairments, “a correctional facility should provide 
prisoners . . . appropriate housing assignments and 
programming opportunities in accordance with their 
diagnoses . . . and treatment or habilitation plans.”83 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 152. 
77 Id. at 153. 
78 Id. at 157. 
79 Id. at 160. 
80 Id. at 163. (emphasis added). 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 179. 
83 Id. at 180. 
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The ABA Standards clearly outline expectations of medical 
treatment within correctional facilities after adopting the 
rationale behind the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle. 
Despite these explicit standards, very few states comply.      
PART III: CASE REVIEW 
I. PRETRIAL DETAINEES 
Very few states have addressed MAT access to all 
prisoners; however, circuits have addressed MAT access to 
pretrial detainees. There are approximately 540,000 pretrial 
detainees in correctional facilities.84 Courts distinguish between 
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees because pretrial 
detainees can only bring claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as they are only confined to ensure their presence 
at trial.85 Because they have not been found guilty of a crime, 
the only rights a pretrial detainee shall lose are those necessarily 
lost through the fact of confinement.86 Pretrial confinement 
must be consistent with the least restrictive means available to 
achieve a valid governmental objective unless further 
deprivation is justified through a valid state interest.87 Despite 
the constitutional differences between pretrial detainees and 
convicted inmates, the legal analysis is similar.88 
Furthermore, the reasons cited for keeping MAT out of 
correctional facilities—criminal justice system does not want 
narcotics in the facilities and methadone is merely an addiction 
substitute—have been rejected by many courts, specifically in 
the pretrial context. In Norris v. Frame, the court held that 
despite there being “no constitutional right to methadone,” the 
correctional facility must provide methadone to pretrial 
detainee because the defendant demonstrated that he had 
regular methadone prescribed to him by a licensed clinic, “that 
 
84 Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 3. 
85 Cudnik v. Kreiger, 392 F. Supp. 305, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1974); see also 
Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. 
El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2000). 
86 Cudnik, 392 F. Supp. at 311. 
87 Id.; see also Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978); Norris 
v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3d Cir. 1978). 
88 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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this treatment was legal and medically accepted, and the prison 
was on notice of these facts.”89 In this case, the correctional 
facility could arrange for the transfer of prisoners with drug 
problems to a facility where the appropriate treatment was 
available; however, the physician determined that it was 
unnecessary.90 The court stated that because the defendant was 
already receiving the medication in an approved program, the 
correctional facility could only refuse to continue treatment if 
there was a legitimate interest in doing so, of which the state 
did not provide.91 Therefore, the decision to cease treatment 
must be left to the authorized methadone facility rather than be 
delegated to penal authorities due to their lack of 
understanding of OUD.92       
Similarly, the court in Cudnik v. Kreiger held that a jail 
policy which prohibited dispensing narcotic drugs was 
unconstitutional because the plaintiff’s pain, temporary 
incapacitation, and loss of liberty did not further the state’s 
interest of securing the presence of an individual for trial nor is 
it related to advancing jail security.93 The court rejected the 
argument that, by allowing methadone access, other inmates 
would also seek methadone and similar drugs because the 
facility can address that problem if it arises by separating those 
receiving MAT treatment from others as they do with men and 
women. To use this basis to deny methadone where there are 
other means to ensure jail security “would not be consistent 
with the least restrictive means of confinement.”94 The court 
also rejected the argument that providing methadone to pretrial 
detainees would create “an illicit jail market for methadone and 
the possibility of theft of the drug”95 on two parts. First, the 
court said that physicians or treatment staff may bring the 
medication to them daily. Second, the court said that a jail 
market for the drug is “unlikely” because methadone can be 
administered in liquid form and must be consumed in the 
presence of whoever administers the drug.96 The court 
 
89 Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188. 
90 Id. at 1185. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1189. 
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instructed the jail to provide pretrial detainees with methadone 
in a secure area of the jail with the appropriate staff so long as 
they were receiving methadone treatment prior to 
confinement.97 
I. CONVICTED INMATES 
Courts recognize that pretrial detainees and prisoners 
have different liberties while confined. However, courts agree 
that methadone should be accessible to those who had a regular 
prescription by a physician prior to confinement, that the 
treatment must be legal and medically accepted, and that the 
prison must be aware of the treatment.98 Courts also agree that 
refusal of medication access is only permissible when it furthers 
the state’s interest, but an appropriate state interest does not 
include fear of an illicit market, the belief that other prisoners 
will want drugs or theft.99 These fears have been the sole 
reasons why correctional facilities do not provide MAT access 
to any type of detainee. However, recent decisions in various 
circuits have determined that MAT should be accessible to 
convicted inmates as well.      
a. COURT CASES 
Courts are stuck analyzing situations on a case-by-case 
basis and are inconsistently protecting inmate’s constitutional 
rights. It is recognized that severe opiate withdrawal symptoms 
can amount to a serious medical need;100 however, the Eighth 
 
97 Id. at 313. 
98 See Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188; Cudnik, 392 F. Supp. at 312; Holly v. 
Rapone, 476 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Kirsch v. Racine Cty. 
Sheriff, 2008 WL 4872595 (E.D. Wisc. 2008). 
99 Id. 
100 See Shaver v. Brimfield Twp., 628 Fed. Appx. 378 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Foelker v. Outagamie Cty., 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding 
opiate withdrawal amounts to a serious medical need); Gonzalez v. 
Cecil Cty., 221 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616 (D. Md. 2002) (finding heroin 
withdrawal is a serious medical need); Hernandez v. Cty. of 
Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“withdrawal is a 
serious and potentially deadly medical condition, with symptoms 
including seizures, hallucinations, agitations and increased blood 
pressure”); Pajas v. Cty. of Monterey, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88955, 17 
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Amendment burden of deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need is extremely high and difficult for plaintiffs to 
meet.101  For example, in one case, the court held that there was 
no severe medical need under the Eighth Amendment when a 
defendant was denied methadone despite being unable to sleep 
or eat without vomiting for two and a half months after 
withdrawing from using five to ten bags of heroin daily.102 In 
another case, excessive vomiting did constitute a serious 
medical need when an inmate who had used seven bags of 
heroin and two bottles of cocaine two days prior; however, the 
court determined that there was no deliberate indifference 
because he was given Clonidine, Benadryl, and anti-nausea 
medication for his withdrawal symptoms.103 The court stated 
that deliberate indifference does not include situations in which 
medical professionals “should have done more, or done it 
differently, or done it better.”104      
 
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (stating drug withdrawal constitutes a serious 
medical need requiring appropriate medical care under the Eighth 
Amendment); Quatroy v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff's Office, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 40807, 29 (E.D. La. 2009) (“acute symptoms of 
withdrawal easily present a serious medical need”); Sirois v. Cichon, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159425, 6 (D.Me. 2013) (concluding that opiate 
withdrawal symptoms can arise to the level of an objectively serious 
medical need). But see, Iacovangelo v. Corr. Med. Care, Inc., 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140679, 10 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that “mild 
withdrawal symptoms, such as vomiting, do not necessarily qualify 
as an objectively serious medical condition”); Avallone v. Hofmann, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86408, 5 (D.Vt. 2009) (symptoms for two days 
“do not generally provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment 
claim”). 
101 See Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
negligent care from a subarachnoid hemorrhage resulting in 
paralysis, disfigurement, loss of ambulatory functions, and severe 
hand spasms does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference 
under the Eighth Amendment); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (holding that 
a prison official cannot be liable under deliberate indifference within 
the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate human conditions of 
confinement unless they do so knowing that the denial could cause 
an excessive risk to inmate health and safety).  
102 Alvarado v. Westchester Cty., 22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014).  
103 Sylvester v. City of Newark, 120 Fed. Appx. 419, 424 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
104 Id. 
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When a prison employee knows that an inmate is 
suffering from withdrawal and fails to treat the symptoms105 or 
not does not provide appropriate medication, deliberate 
indifference can be satisfied.106 For example, an inmate told the 
staff that he was a heroin addict who would likely go into 
withdrawal without methadone.107 Despite being a heroin 
addict, the inmate was refused methadone and given only 
Clonidine (a blood pressure medication) as a way to curb 
withdrawal symptoms.108 His symptoms were exacerbated as 
he became violently ill and was diagnosed with pneumonia 
which, due to only receiving an over-the-counter stomach 
medication, led to his death.109 The court found that a policy of 
refusing appropriate withdrawal treatment “could lead to an 
inference of deliberate indifference.”110      
Stigma can result in denying methadone, which some 
courts consider to be deliberate indifference.111 Despite the jail’s 
policy of allowing methadone and the recommendation to give 
him a reduced dose, an inmate was denied access to methadone 
because he had been off his prescription for three days.112 The 
inmate had severe withdrawal symptoms, including defecating 
on himself and in his cell, hearing voices, being disoriented, and 
believing he was at the “wedding hotel.”113 A registered nurse 
in the facility believed that the inmate was “playing the system” 
and did not require medical attention. The inmate continued to 
 
105 Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997). 
106 See Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972) (“a charge of 
deliberate indifference by prison authorities to a prisoner’s request 
for essential medical treatment is sufficient to state a claim”); 
Gonzalez, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (holding that a policy of refusing 
meaningful treatment for heroin withdrawal could support a finding 
of deliberate indifference). 
107 Gonzalez, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 617. 
111 See Harper v. Lawrence Cty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“our prior pronouncements on the illegality of delayed or 
inadequate treatment for alcohol withdrawal should have sufficed to 
put the supervisory Defendants on notice . . . that delayed or 
inadequate treatment of alcohol withdrawal would be unlawful”); 
Foelker v. Outagamie Cty., 394 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2005). 
112 Foelker, 394 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2005). 
113 Id. at 511. 
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deteriorate, and the staff transported him to the hospital two 
days later.114 The court found that there was a severe medical 
need because the inmate had delusions and defecated on 
himself. 115 The court stated that “not [being] in extreme distress 
does not necessarily mean that [there is not a] serious medical 
need.”116 Because “direct evidence is not always necessary to 
state a claim” regarding the severity of one’s medical condition, 
the court also found that there was deliberate indifference since 
the facility knew the inmate had not taken his methadone and 
no additional medical attention was provided to the inmate 
even after he defecated on himself and in the cell.117 In another 
case, two inmates suffered withdrawal symptoms after being 
denied methadone.118 Both had their daily vital signs monitored 
instead, while one received Tylenol.119 The lower court ruled in 
favor of the jail alluding to “the tendency of a drug dependent 
person to exaggerate his or her symptoms in order to obtain 
drugs.”120 The Fourth Circuit affirmed for security reasons; 
however, they did nothing to negate the outrageous stigma that 
influenced the lower court’s decision. 
Some courts hold tightly onto the idea that, despite there 
being an Eighth Amendment analysis to the medical needs of 
inmates, there is still no constitutional right to methadone.121  
However, other courts have found that there is deliberate 
indifference on behalf of the facility when prison officials 
“deliberately ignore the express orders of a prisoner’s prior 
physician for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the 
prisoner,” and that security concerns are not related to the 
medical needs of prisoners.122      
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 513. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.; see also Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to provide medication based on the idea that the 
complainant was malingering,  not in pain but wanting to get high, 
is deliberate indifference). 
118 Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31, 31 (4th Cir. 1983). 
119 Id. at 32. 
120 Id. at 33. 
121 Norris, 585 F.2d at 1188; Love v. Thompson, 2016 WL 6991202, 1-5 
(W.D. Pa. 2016). 
122 Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 
Strain v. Sanham, 2009 WL 172898, at 6 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
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While some facilities may not provide MAT to inmates 
with OUD, some facilities do grant access to inmates who use 
methadone for pain management. Prison doctors prescribed an 
inmate with methadone to treat chronic pain disease resulting 
from a spinal injury; however, the new facility to which he was 
transferred gave him Tylenol instead, as they had a policy that 
prohibited the distribution of narcotics “under [any] 
circumstances.”123 The defendants stated that they had no 
problem administering methadone for pain management and, 
if an inmate had an existing, valid prescription for methadone 
for chronic pain, the prescription would be honored subject to 
the jail physician’s medical judgment.124 The court ruled in 
favor of the inmate because despite meeting all jail criteria, he 
was still refused his medication for no valid reason.125      
In a similar case, the court ruled in favor of an inmate 
when a facility denied access to methadone simply because he 
was not housed in the section of inmates who could receive 
methadone.126 Instead, the facility provided the inmate with 
Tylenol and Naproxen for pain management.127 The court ruled 
that this could result in deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need under the Eighth Amendment.128 Other courts 
have held similarly when no-narcotics jail policies resulted in 
inmates receiving Tylenol for pain instead of their physician-
prescribed methadone.129 This clearly demonstrates an issue 
 
123 Kirsch v. Racine Cty. Sheriff, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91538, 5 (E.D. 
Wis.2008). 
124 Id. at *7-8. 
125 Id. 
126 Chess v. Dovey, No. CIV S-07-1767 LKK DAD P, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15835, at *57 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011). 
127 Id. at *62. 
128 Id. at *64; see also Anderson v. Benton Cty., Nos. 03-6155-TC, 03-806-
TC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19453 at *19 (D. Or. Sep. 21, 2004) (denying 
summary judgment to the defendant after finding that a reasonable 
jury could find deliberate indifference after the facility denied an 
inmate methadone for pain management despite having a 
physician’s prescription). 
129 See Franklin v. Dudley, 2:07-cv-2259 FCD KJN P, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 138549, at 6-8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010) (finding evidence of 
triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant violated the Eighth 
Amendment when the plaintiff was previously prescribed narcotic 
pain medication but now was given only over-the-counter 
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under the ADA. When methadone is used for pain 
management, courts are more favorable to ensuring inmates 
have access when compared to inmates who are using it as a 
substance use treatment method, despite both categories of 
people having prior physician prescriptions and experiencing 
withdrawal symptoms from cessation. Courts have consistently 
found that Tylenol instead of methadone is not an appropriate 
alternative for pain management but is an appropriate 
alternative for substance use withdrawals. It is clear that the 
difference lies only with the purpose of the medication and that 
those with OUD have an everlasting stigma that inhibits them 
from adequate treatment. However, this is beginning to change.      
Most recently, the First Circuit in Smith v. Aroostook 
County held that Aroostook County Jail must provide MAT to 
an inmate under the Eighth Amendment because she faced “an 
imminent, painful and dangerous withdrawal and an attendant 
risk of continued treatment, overdose, and death.”130 The court 
found that (1) the jail’s practice of denying individuals 
prescribed MAT is a derivative from the jail, not a medical 
decision by Katahdin Valley Health Center (KVHC);131 (2) it is 
unclear if KVHC may even be capable of assessing inmates’ 
needs for MAT, as none of their staff are licensed and one of 
their nurses testified that they did not know the standards of 
care nor the symptoms of OUD; and (3) the defendants had five 
months before the plaintiff was incarcerated to medically assess 
her needs for MAT, and they did not do so.132 The First Circuit 
also found that the jail violated the ADA by being an 
undisputed public entity that denied an undisputed qualified 
individual with a disability her necessary medication without 
assessing her medical needs or providing any “true 
 
medication such as Tylenol due to the prison’s no-narcotics policy); 
Strain, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4760, at *7 (denying summary judgment 
after the plaintiff raised the issue that over-the-counter medications, 
such as Tylenol, were not appropriate substitutes for Methadone.).  
130 Smith v. Aroostook Cty., 376 F. Supp. 3d 146, 157 (D. Me. 2019); see 
also Smith v. Fitzpatrick, No. 1:18-cv-00288-NT (D. Me. 2018) (finding 
a settlement agreement with the Maine Department of Corrections 
allowing the plaintiff to receive buprenorphine or an equivalent 
medication while incarcerated). 
131 KVHC was the medical center with which the jail was contracted 
132 Aroostook Cty., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 157. 
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justification.”133 Because the jail previously provided MAT to a 
pregnant woman in the jail itself without any problems,134 the 
court believed that the defendants’ decision to deny MAT 
access was not based on a medical assessment but on their 
general attitude towards OUD.135 The court found that the 
defendants’ representatives “lacked a baseline awareness of 
what OUD was despite serving a population that 
disproportionately dies of that condition” and the 
representatives claimed “learning more about how to treat the 
disorder was boring.”136 The court instructed the jail to provide 
the plaintiff with her medication in whatever way the 
defendants deemed most appropriate for security needs, 
including providing the medication in the jail, taking the 
plaintiff into the community to receive medication, transferring 
her to another facility capable of providing the medication or 
“releasing the plaintiff on medical furlough if the jail is 
otherwise unable to accommodate her needs.”137 
The court in Pesce v. Coppinger also held that under the 
Eighth Amendment and the ADA, a correctional facility was 
required to provide methadone treatment to an inmate during 
his sixty-day incarceration.138 The court found that the 
correctional facility’s attempt to require the defendant to 
“participate in a treatment program that bares [sic] strong 
resemblance to the methods that failed [him] for five years, 
including detoxification,”139 would contradict the plaintiff’s 
physician’s recommendations, place him at a higher risk of 
relapse, and make him physically ill for several days.140 The 
court found that the facility’s policy against methadone 
treatment does not consider inmates’ specific medical needs 
stating “medical decisions that rest on stereotypes about the 
disabled rather than ‘an individualized inquiry into the 
patient’s condition’ may be considered discriminatory.”141 The 
 
133 Id. at 158. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 160. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 162. 
138 Pesce v. Coppinger, 355 F. Supp. 3d 35 (D. Mass. 2018). 
139 Id. at 45.  
140 Id. at 46. 
141 Id. (citing Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 
2006)). 
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defendants did not provide any explanation for why they could 
not safely and securely administer the medication under the 
supervision of medical staff; therefore, the policy is either 
“‘arbitrary or capricious-as to imply that it was pretext for some 
discriminatory motive’ or ‘discriminatory on its face.’”142 The 
court found that the policy implemented by the correctional 
facility was a blanket policy and had no indication of whether 
it would consider an individual’s medical history and 
prescribed treatment; therefore, the facility had “deliberate 
indifference to his medical condition.”143      
Despite these courts mandating access to MAT on an 
individual level, the reasoning applies to inmates with OUD as 
a class. In Washington, the American Civil Liberties Union       
reached a settlement with Whatcom County Jail in which the 
jail must provide MAT to “clinically appropriate [male and 
female] inmates who are in withdrawal from opioids as 
medically indicated . . . regardless of whether they were already 
taking MAT at their time of entry.”144 Prior to this settlement, 
buprenorphine was distributed solely to pregnant women with 
OUD despite having a policy that states medication services 
must be “clinically appropriate and provided in a timely, safe, 
and sufficient matter.”145 
Individuals are forced to endure excruciating pain 
simply because they have a disability. Correctional facilities 
resort to a myriad of excuses for not providing MAT; however, 
courts consistently reject those. Despite that, the courts have 
posed a nearly impossible hurdle of proving both a serious 
medical need and a deliberate indifference an individual with 
OUD must face to receive legally and medically accepted 
medication to treat their disability. MAT is provided to treat 
pain for individuals without OUD, and courts reject the 
proposition that Tylenol is an acceptable substitute. However, 
courts hold the exact opposite when faced with a plaintiff who 
 
142 Id. 
143 Id.; see also Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 493 (D. Mass. 
2012) (“[P]laintiff[s] who allege[] that prison officials repeatedly 
ignore[] [a] physician’s recommendations[] [have] stated sufficient 
facts to establish an Eighth Amendment violation”).  
144 Settlement Agreement at 5, Kortlever et al. v. Whatcom County, 
(No. 2:18-cv-00823). 
145 Complaint by Petitioner at 11, Kortlever et al. v. Whatcom 
County, (No. 2:18-cv-00823). 
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has OUD. It is clear that the stigma associated with illicit 
substances runs deeper than the illegal substance itself, but also 
affects individuals who are on a legally and medically accepted 
regiment. Despite the courts’ inconsistency, states have begun 
protecting these individuals.      
b. State Initiative      
Whether by case law or legislation, states are beginning 
to act. Many individual states have created programs to target 
recidivism rates and to combat overdose and death. The states 
themselves are not concerned with the security reasons quoted 
by correctional facilities, as these are considered inappropriate 
bars to medication access by the courts. When jail-based state 
programs have encountered security issues, such as those in 
Rhode Island, they have been addressed with little issue. 
Two model states have implemented successful 
programs—New York and Rhode Island. In 1987, New York 
became the first state to initiate a methadone treatment 
program for incarcerated opiate-dependent inmates.146 The Key 
Extended Entry Program (KEEP) has two components; the first 
being jail-based in Rikers Island Correctional Facility147 and the 
second being community-based.148 KEEP has two withdrawal 
protocols: heroin withdrawal involves twelve days of tapering 
methadone, and methadone withdrawal involves tapering 
based on the community dosage.149 To be eligible for KEEP, 
inmates must receive a sentence of one year or less or pretrial 
detainees who face a possible sentence of one year or less. 
Anyone who has a sentence of more than one year is not eligible 
for KEEP.150 Once an inmate or pretrial detainee begins the 
program, they undergo specific medication distribution 
protocols and psychoeducation.151 The medication distribution 
protocols include the direct observation therapy (DOT) 
 
146 Vincent Tomasino, et al., The Key Extended Entry Program (KEEP): 
A Methadone Treatment Program for Opiate-Dependent Inmates, 68 
MOUNT SINAI J. OF MEDICINE, 14 (Jan. 2001). 
147 Hereinafter “Rikers.” 
148 Tomasino, supra note 146, at 14. 
149 Id. at 15. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 16. 
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method.152 With this method, inmates are observed taking the 
medication and must verbally respond to a question asked by 
the correction officer to insure ingestion. The DOT method has 
significantly decreased drug diversion.153 Through 
psychoeducation, inmates and pretrial detainees regularly meet 
with counselors to discuss dose maintenance and treatment 
issues.154 KEEP also offers relapse prevention through 
individual and group counseling in which inmates and pretrial 
detainees “identify triggers to relapse and identify methods of 
dealing with those triggers.”155 KEEP participants may also 
receive alternatives to incarceration, such as residential and 
outpatient programs, if drug treatment is determined to be 
more effective than incarceration.156 KEEP statistics show that 
individuals who receive a higher post-release dose of MAT are 
more likely to continue reporting to their designated 
community-based organization because individuals must 
“achieve a true ‘blocking dose’ in order to remain in treatment 
and to eliminate the craving for heroin.”157 
While KEEP has exhibited success in decreasing 
recidivism and managing substance abuse to avoid overdose, 
issues have begun to rise as Rikers is being shut down and 
inmates in KEEP are being relocated throughout the state. 
These inmates were being tapered off their medication in 
preparation for their transfer; however, the issue for these 
inmates still persists.158 As of July 1st, a new program allows 
inmates who were transferred to Elmira prison to receive 
methadone, making this the first program to allow MAT in 
New York state prisons.159 This allows inmates who were 
transferred from Rikers to Elmira to continue methadone, 
rather than undergo tapering protocols, but only if their 





155 Id. at 17. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 18. 
158 Alison Knopf, Methadone Now Allowed in Upstate NY Prison, If 
Inmates Come from Rikers OTP First, ADDICTION TREATMENT FORUM 
(Aug. 7, 2019). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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physician to dispense MAT; however, they partnered with 
United Health Services and the Opioid Treatment Program who 
send licensed physicians to the Elmira facility weekly to 
distribute the medication.161 As of right now, only the 
medication will be provided in the Elmira facility—no 
counseling or other services will be provided—however, this is 
a crucial start to maintaining treatment compliance with these 
individuals and piloting a program for other state facilities to 
follow.162      
To further this program, the Senate passed a bill to 
establish a MAT program for state and county correctional 
facilities, which would create a substance abuse treatment 
program in each state and county correctional facility.163 The 
program would be similar to KEEP in that inmates and pretrial 
detainees will be screened for OUD and provided one of the 
three MAT options approved by the FDA.164 Individuals will 
then work with a specialist to determine an individualized 
biopsychosocial treatment plan, including counseling. Per the 
bill, the only individual who can adjust the dosage, commence 
or cease MAT is a licensed physician.165 The bill also creates a 
re-entry program to inmates who receive MAT while 
incarcerated that includes resources for local treatment 
facilities, housing, employment, and other information that will 
assist an inmate in continuing recovery once released.166 
In 2016, the Rhode Island Legislature approved a $2 
million annual budget to expand MAT programs in prisons as 
part of a fully federally-regulated opioid treatment program.167 
Since then, Rhode Island is the only state that offers all three 
primary MAT options to inmates, regardless of whether they 
are pretrial detainees or convicted inmates, in all Rhode Island 




163 S. 2161B, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.Y. 2019) (as of Feb. 27, 




167 Nicole Beckman, Hanna Bliska, & Eliza Jane Schaeffer, Medication 
Assisted Treatment Programs in Vermont State Correctional Facilities: 
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approximately 300 inmates receive MAT every day.168 The MAT 
program is run by Comprehensive Health Care, Centered on 
You (CODAC) Behavioral Healthcare and includes creating a 
re-entry treatment plan prior to release that includes various 
recovery services such as primary care physicians, specialty 
physicians, specialized healthcare needs, housing, education, 
transportation, mental health services, and legal support.169 
Upon entering the facility, inmates are screened by CODAC 
physicians for OUD and are given the option to continue 
treatment for up to a year or, if they had not previously received 
treatment and screen positive, they may opt in to receive 
treatment for a year, so long as their sentence is a year or less.170 
After opting in to MAT, inmates must complete a 
biopsychosocial assessment by a CODAC physician, who then 
creates a treatment plan, as well as manages doses.171 The 
RIDOC requires that inmates receiving MAT participate in 
behavioral health groups run by CODAC, as well as individual 
therapy if deemed necessary. To combat security issues with 
drug diversion, RIDOC switched from pill medication to strips, 
such as buprenorphine strips, which melt on the tongue. Since 
this switch, the black market for drugs is waning.172      
 Vermont implemented a MAT program as a result of a 
court decision and bad press. In 1999, Keith Griggs was charged 
with forgery and entered into a plea agreement that allowed 
him to enter into furlough so he could continue taking his 
methadone.173 In 2001, the Vermont Department of Corrections 
(VDOC) suspended his furlough for two weeks and refused to 
provide methadone, causing abrupt withdrawal. The Vermont 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision that he was entitled to his 
medication; however, the jail released him early rather than 
provide his medication.174 The same situation happened to 
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Shawn Gibson, who was denied methadone access while 
incarcerated, forcing him to undergo abrupt withdrawal.175      
These cases highlight the controversy over OUD in 
many states, while also highlighting the power of media 
coverage. Although the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that 
inmates must have access to MAT while incarcerated, 
correctional facilities were still denying MAT access. As a result 
of web articles discussing the lack of MAT access in correctional 
facilities, the VDOC adopted a year pilot program, which 
allowed inmates to receive MAT for a year of their incarceration 
sentence.176 However, the application of the program only 
provided ninety days of MAT access and approval for MAT 
access is highly selective, leaving many inmates with 
terminated treatment plans and prescriptions.177 The 
correctional facilities terminate MAT access for three reasons: 
(1) expected length of stay exceeds thirty days, (2) the 
individual was seen or is suspected of diverting drugs,178 and 
(3) the urine test turned up another illicit drug that is not 
marijuana.179      
Similar to Rhode Island, VDOC has taken precautions to 
decrease drug diversion. For example, inmates must wear 
certain clothes that do not have pockets when getting their 
medication.180 This raises issues with other inmates who want 
the medication because they are then better able to identify 
those who are receiving the medication, which causes targeting. 
Some inmates divert drugs because the doses are so low that 
they are going through withdrawal before their next dose.181 
The jail claims that using illicit drugs with MAT can cause a 
health and safety risk.182 However, medical professionals 
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ceasing treatment because the alternative is worse. Jails also 
view methadone and other MAT methods as a privilege and 
provide alternatives to managing withdrawal symptoms.183 
Jails frequently receive complaints that these alternatives do not 
subside the withdrawal symptoms enough to make them 
manageable; however, the jail administration views it as 
“patients being upset that their medication wasn’t 
continued.”184 After another web article was published 
highlighting the personal stories of inmates who underwent 
excruciating withdrawal symptoms after being denied access or 
abruptly taken off medication rather than tapered, the VDOC 
expanded treatment from 30 days to 120 days.185      
 In 2018, Vermont Lawmakers voted to make opioid 
treatment widely available in correctional facilities. The new 
law allowed inmates to receive MAT for more than 120 days if 
necessary, as well as allowed inmates to get a prescription while 
in prison, rather than limiting treatment to inmates who 
received MAT prior to incarceration.186 Under the new law, 
inmates must be medically assessed within fourteen days of 
incarceration. If at any point an inmate is no longer deemed 
medically necessary to continue MAT, only a licensed medical 
physician may discontinue MAT.187 
Other states have also taken the initiative to implement 
MAT policies without waiting for court decisions. In 2015, New 
Hampshire implemented a policy that provides MAT to 
inmates while they are incarcerated and before release.188 
However, they may only receive medication after they 
complete six months of behavioral, educational, and counseling 
treatment components.189 Upon release, inmates are mandated 
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to follow up with a licensed alcohol and drug counselor to 
ensure successful re-entry and treatment compliance.190 While 
this policy protects inmates from overdosing upon release, it 
still does not protect inmates under the Eighth Amendment and 
ADA because inmates are forced to experience the same 
withdrawal symptoms.      
Missouri has implemented a policy that provides an 
incentive to participating inmates. After being screened and 
referred to the program, inmates are granted a reduction in 
sentence time if they cooperate with MAT, which has increased 
program participation and decreased recidivism.191 Upon 
release, inmates receive a different form of MAT, Vivitrol,192 
and receive consistent one-on-one interaction with a post-
release caseworker to ensure that individuals are maintaining 
sobriety and complying with treatment recommendations.193 
The flaw in Missouri’s plan is that inmates can only be referred 
to enter substance abuse treatment by the court or by the Board 
of Probation and Parole.194      
There has been movement in Congress as well. The Senate 
proposed the Community Re-Entry through Addiction 
Treatment to Enhance (CREATE) Opportunities Act, which 
would “establish a grant program to provide more MAT 
options while incarcerated and continued access to care upon 
release.”195 This Senate bill has a House companion bill that 
would create a grant program to allow states and local 
government to “develop, implement, or expand programs to 




192 Vivitrol blocks opioid receptors in the brain so opioid 
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also make more medications available, require staff to be 
appropriately trained in addiction services, and address the 
increased risk of overdose by connecting individuals to 
continued MAT treatment upon release from incarceration. 
State and federal governments have realized that reliance 
on the court is moot; therefore, they are working to recognize 
and address the needs of individuals with OUD to ensure 
individual success. While there may be legislative action, there 
are other routes correctional facilities and states as a whole can 
pursue. 
PART IV: SOLUTIONS 
 The ABA provides clear guidelines as to how inmates 
should receive medical treatment. Correctional facilities 
continue to try and provide medication such as Tylenol, 
Clonidine, and Naproxen instead of MAT out of fear of 
diversion and introducing narcotics into facilities; however, this 
violates ABA Standards. Because correctional facilities are not 
providing adequate treatment and are outright refusing 
services that are related to drug rehabilitation, the ADA is also 
violated. By not providing them the adequate medication, 
inmates are undergoing excruciating pain, thus correctional 
facilities are also violating the Eighth Amendment by having 
deliberate indifference to the serious medical harm and are not 
considering individuals on a case-by-case basis. Only when 
MAT access is constitutionally protected will these hurdles be 
overcome. This can only be achievable once courts (1) 
acknowledge the bad precedent upon which many are relying; 
(2) adopt bright-line definitions; and (3) mandate that relevant 
policies be decided by the appropriate professionals. 
I. FAULTY RELIANCE ON BAD PRECEDENT 
Despite the favorable holding in Norris v. Frame, many 
courts heavily rely on its statement that there is no 
constitutional right to methadone.197 This reliance is extremely 
flawed for two reasons. First, Norris v. Frame determined a lack 
of constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process clause because the plaintiffs were pretrial detainees and 
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were not granted rights under the Eighth Amendment.198  
However, that court still found in favor of the plaintiff under 
the Due Process Clause because the correctional facility refused 
to review his needs on an individualized basis.199 Courts should 
not rely so heavily on a singular dictum statement. Instead, 
courts should be following the constitutionally mandated test 
under the Eighth Amendment. In addition to outlining the 
serious medical need and deliberate indifference prongs to the 
Eighth Amendment, the court in Estelle found that the 
obligation to provide medical care to inmates extends to both 
situations in which the denial “may actually produce physical 
torture or a lingering death” and those in which “denial of 
medical care may result in pain and suffering with which no 
one suggests would serve any penological purpose.”200  
Excessive pain, vomiting, uncontrollable defecation, and 
hallucinations are only some of the symptoms of withdrawal 
from opioids and MAT. By denying MAT, correctional facilities 
are knowingly inducing these symptoms, none of which are 
symptoms that a rational person would believe serves any 
penological purpose; therefore, it is a blatant violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, because courts have 
determined that inmates have a constitutional right under the 
Eighth Amendment to psychiatric and psychological 
medication to alleviate symptoms of a serious disease if denial 
of such treatment would cause substantial harm to the 
inmate,201 inmates should undoubtedly already have access to 
MAT. MAT is an FDA-approved treatment for OUD that is 
intended to alleviate the harsh symptoms and denial of 
treatment can result in substantial harm and even death. 
Inmates are forced to rely on correctional facilities to treat their 
medical needs;202 however, doctors cannot act on their duty to 
properly treat their patients if the medication is not even an 
option.      
Second, Norris v. Frame relied on an FDA regulation203 with 
no specification as to how the FDA regulation denied 
constitutional rights to methadone. The FDA regulation in 
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question outlines methadone treatment programs, including 
“maintenance treatment” programs which are medical services 
that provide “stable dosage levels for a period in excess of 21 
days as an oral substitute for heroin or other morphine-like 
drugs, for an individual dependent on heroin.”204 Because 
inmates would receive MAT for more than twenty-one days, 
correctional facilities would constitute maintenance treatment 
programs. The FDA regulation then describes how methadone 
dosage should be determined based on the symptoms that each 
individual exhibits.205 The FDA regulations cited by Norris 
neither explicitly nor implicitly state that an inmate does not 
have a right to MAT. The same definitions and criteria are 
applicable today under Federal Public Health regulations.206 
The misinterpretation of the regulations, as well as the faulty 
reliance on bad precedent, are blocking individuals from 
receiving appropriate medical treatment for a disability. 
II. ADEQUATE DEFINITIONS 
The Eighth Amendment analysis under Estelle includes 
phrases such as “serious medical need” and “deliberate 
indifference” but there is little help defining such terms, which 
results in inconsistent constitutional protection. There is no 
consistent test to determine whether a physical ailment 
constitutes a serious medical need. Under the current guidance, 
some courts have interpreted excessive vomiting to constitute a 
serious medical need, while others say it is not sufficient. This 
lack of clarity allows correctional facilities to deny medical 
treatment under any façade they choose, opening the door for 
increased discrimination. Additionally, courts and correctional 
facilities are both demonstrating discriminatory behaviors by 
inconsistently analyzing deliberate indifference. Courts have 
found the use of Tylenol instead of methadone can constitute a 
deliberate indifference in regard to pain management but is 
perfectly acceptable in regard to treating OUD. This 
inconsistency is a clear demonstration of the court’s stigma 
towards individuals with OUD. Ignoring prior diagnoses,207 
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denying medication for non-medical reasons,208 and choosing a 
treatment method that is easier and less effective209 are all 
recognized methods of satisfying deliberate indifference, yet 
correctional facilities continue to escape liability when denying 
medication for these exact reasons because there is no 
consistency among courts. For this two-part test to be applied 
consistently and fairly, there must be a clear definition written 
into a binding agent. 
III. FACILITY POLICIES 
Correctional facilities do not need to wait for court and 
legislative decisions. They may begin prioritizing the needs of 
the underserved by reviewing their policies surrounding MAT. 
These policies should shift the responsibility of medical 
decisions to qualified individuals, address the necessary 
concerns within the facility, and implement effective MAT 
programming. 
a. PHYSICIANS AS DECISIONMAKERS      
The ABA Standards has reviewed all necessary 
constitutional and statutory provisions as well as case law and 
has determined that there should be a standard of care,210 which 
includes leaving all medical decisions to a qualified health 
professional, adopting treatment that is medically accepted, 
ensuring an inmate’s continuity of care upon entrance into a 
facility.      
There is a trend towards giving deference to medical 
professionals when determining access to MAT; however, this 
is not moving fast enough. Currently, jail administrators are 
deciding to cease MAT before consulting with a physician, 
simply because they believe that providing MAT will cause 
security issues and that MAT is replacing one addiction with 
another. This contrasts with the ABA Standards, which were 
developed based on the idea that there is a universal belief 
among correctional facilities and that universal belief includes 
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trusting “a qualified health care professional . . . to oversee and 
direct the provision of health care in that facility.”211 OUD is a 
medical concern and should be addressed only by a licensed 
physician, rather than by uninformed and uninterested jail 
administrators. Despite courts placing the decision on the jail 
administrators, states are following the recommendation of the 
ABA Standards by putting the power into the hands of the 
physicians. The bills passed by individual states explicitly state      
that medical decisions regarding dosage, commencement, and 
discontinuation of MAT should only be done by a licensed 
physician. These state bills are forcing correctional facilities to 
comply with the ADA by first assessing an inmate’s or pretrial 
detainee’s medical needs before determining the appropriate 
treatment.      
As the ABA Standards suggest, the physicians should 
create one distinct policy that is applicable to all correctional 
facilities to both inmates and pretrial detainees. As it stands, in 
many cases, a difference among physician opinions can keep 
inmates from receiving MAT; however, courts do not consider 
this deliberate indifference.212 Furthermore, inmates cannot 
pass the deliberate indifference hurdle if there is no specific 
policy implemented by the facility that denies access to 
methadone.213 Courts seem to approve of facilities with a case-
by-case MAT screening system and object to facilities that have 
a blanket no-narcotics policy. However, this creates a path for 
facilities to claim they have a case-by-case screening system, 
such as that in      Aroostook County,214 and still deny everyone 
anyway. By making MAT access constitutional, and creating a 
blanket policy for all correctional facilities, these issues will be 
eradicated, and every inmate, administrator, and physician will 
have a clear expectation regardless of national location.      
The blanket policy should also consider the appropriate 
alternative medications. Many correctional facilities provide 
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Tylenol, Clonidine, Naproxen, and other medications because 
there is no consistent medically approved alternative. These 
medications should only be used when an inmate opts out of 
using MAT or has any other aversion to its use, such as an 
allergy. In no way should these alternative medications be used 
as a way for facilities to not provide the proposed 
constitutionally mandated MAT. It is also important that the 
physicians who make these policies be unaffiliated with 
correctional facilities in an attempt to diminish the risk that 
doctors will determine detainees ineligible for MAT due to 
facility influence.      
The ABA Standards also reinforce the assurance that 
there must be a continuity of care once an inmate enters a 
facility.215 By creating a constitutional protection, individuals 
will be able to continue on their prescribed treatment modality 
until they are evaluated by a licensed professional, who may 
then determine if there is a continued need. Creating a 
constitutional protection to MAT will not provide MAT to 
everyone who steps foot into a correctional facility. The 
constitutional mandate will, however, ensure that people have 
access to safe and FDA-approved medication to treat their 
disabilities. MAT recipients can still be evaluated by physicians 
at any point during treatment and removed from medication if 
a trained physician deems it no longer necessary. The inverse is 
true in that people may be re-eligible for it at another point in 
their journey to recovery. A constitutional protection for MAT 
will not increase the worries of correctional facilities, as there 
are ample ways to address these concerns. 
b. ADDRESS CONCERNS WITHIN FACILITIES 
Correctional facilities cite drug diversion as a core 
reason why MAT should not be provided in facilities; however, 
there are ample successful alternatives—medicine strips that 
melt in one’s mouth,216 liquid medication, injections, having the 
inmate answer questions during medication distribution to 
ensure consumption, and even separating MAT recipients from 
other inmates. Vermont makes inmates who receive MAT to 
wear clothes without pockets; however, this creates an issue 
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because recipients are more likely to be targeted by drug-
seeking inmates. Therefore, this should only be used if MAT 
recipients are already separated from other inmates.      
Proper education and preparation are vital in ensuring 
that MAT is not diverted. By not offering MAT, correctional 
facilities are inadvertently promoting diversion from inmates 
with OUD who would benefit from MAT treatment.217 
Medication must be counted, recorded, and stored in locked 
cabinets. The administration of medication should take a few 
minutes and recipients must be closely observed. If diversion 
remains a concern, regular drug screens can be used to check 
inmates for abnormal levels. Most importantly, MAT should 
never be taken away as part of a punishment. That would be 
like taking away diabetes or heart disease medication. Knowing 
that excruciating withdrawal symptoms would result by taking 
away MAT medication simply for “bad” behavior borders on 
torture. Furthermore, forced detoxification from medication 
can undermine an individual’s willingness to engage in MAT 
in the future which compromises the likelihood of long-term 
recovery.218 To determine the most appropriate methods for 
addressing concerns, correctional facilities could resort to 
programming resources219 or look to states with successful 
programs.      
c. EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMING 
Some states, such as Vermont, have programs in place 
that provide MAT prior to release, but not upon entrance into a 
correctional facility. While providing MAT before release is 
important to decrease the risk of overdose once in the 
community, it does not address the withdrawal symptoms 
inmates experience upon entering a correctional facility; 
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therefore, it is still in violation of the ADA and the Eighth 
Amendment. These programs do not medically assess 
individuals before determining their medical needs and they 
force inmates to undergo excruciating withdrawal symptoms. 
The ideal nationally implemented program would reflect 
similarities in programs such as the one implemented in Rhode 
Island which provides MAT upon entrance for up to a year and 
ninety days prior to release. This complies with both the ADA 
and the Eighth Amendment because it allows individuals to be 
treated for their medical needs and alleviates withdrawal 
symptoms, making it a more effective program for treatment 
and successful release. Furthermore, the ABA Standards used 
Estelle to determine that an inmate “who is lawfully taking 
prescription drugs . . . should be maintained on that course of 
medication . . . .”220 Screening should be routine to ensure that 
the appropriate medication and dosage is being administered. 
President Trump reports an amplitude of support to identifying 
and treating offenders in the criminal justice system who have 
OUD, including screening every federal inmate for OUD upon 
intake.221 This should not only include federal inmates. OUD 
screening must include all levels of detainees with prior 
diagnoses and others who may meet the criteria. Despite 
suggestions under the ADA, simply being a “prior user” before 
incarceration does not inhibit them from ADA and Eighth 
Amendment protections.      
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court said that a remedy for unsafe 
conditions need not await a tragedy.222 However, tragedies are 
occurring daily as individuals with a disability are being denied 
their medically accepted medication and being forced to endure 
excruciating pain, and sometimes death, with little to no 
reprieve. How severe must the tragedy be before courts, 
correctional facilities, and legislators see that these individuals 
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deserve to be viewed as valuable rather than disposable? These 
decisions to deny access to MAT affect the lives of thousands of 
Americans. Correctional facilities are choosing to ignore 
decades of scientific evidence, as well as the successful 
programs implemented in Riker’s Island, Rhode Island, and 
other jurisdictions, all of which illustrate the success of MAT 
access and the capability of facilities throughout the country. 
It is well known that the correctional system is flawed 
and that individuals with a history of substance use are 
disproportionately affected. Correctional facilities cannot 
continue to hide behind the façade of safety and security, 
because their unconstitutional methods are having the exact 
opposite effect. Denial of MAT to qualified individuals is a 
violation of both the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment because it is a deliberate indifference 
to a serious medical need and Title II of the ADA for denying a 
qualified individual access to a public entity’s service based on 
a disability. The ample guidelines available for correctional 
facility administrators to follow leave no more room for 
excuses. It is time for the blatant discrimination to cease.      
 
